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The Concept of Anachronism and the
Historian’s Truth Jacques Rancière In
the preface to his book The Problem of
Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The
Religion of Rabelais, Lucien Febvre tells us
the following:“The problem is to determine
what set of precautions to take and what
rules to follow in order to avoid the worst
of all sins, the sin that cannot be forgiven—
anachronism.” Febvre’s text raises, for
us, three questions, which I shall try to
untangle here. Firstly, why, for the historian,
is anachronism the unforgivable sin above
all others? Secondly, to be such a sin, what
must anachronism be? Thirdly, to give
anachronism the status of a sin fatal to the
spirit of history, what must history be? This
triple questioning falls within the framework
of a larger reflection on the question of truth
in history, a reflection led by a hypothesis that
1
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1. Trans. Originally
published
as ‘Le concept
d’anachronisme
et la vérité de
l’historien,’ L’Inactuel:
psychanalyse et culture
6, Autumn (1996):
53–68
2. Lucien Febvre,
Le problème de
l’incroyance au XVIe
siècle. La religion de
Rabelais, (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1968), 15. The
Problem of Unbelief in
the Sixteenth Century:
The Religion of
Rabelais, translated by
B. Gottlieb, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1985),
5. Trans. We have given
a direct translation
from the French quoted
by Rancière. This is
because the English
translation by Gottlieb
corrects Febvre’s use
of the present tense
by using the past
tense. For example,
the Febvre text in
French, “Un enfant naît.
Il vit. Sans delai, on le
porte à l’église,” which
translates directly as “A
child is born. He lives.
Without delay, they
take him to the church,”
Gottlieb translates as
“A child was born, and
it was living. It was
carried without delay
to the church.” For
reasons that become
clear below, it is
important to leave the
French in the historical
present.
.

I now formulate in the most general way. The hypothesis is that the
constitution of history as a scientific discourse involves a knot of
philosophical questions which have nothing to do with questions
concerning the “methodology” or the “epistemology” of history. This
knot concerns rather the relations of time, speech, and truth. Yet it is
never treated as such in the historian’s discourse. It is treated instead by
poetic procedures for the construction of historical narrative. I understand
“poetic” in the classical sense, namely that which comes under a techne
for the construction of a plot, for the arrangement of its parts and its
appropriate mode of enunciation. In other words, the three traditional
functions of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio. The hypothesis, therefore, can
be summarised as follows: history is constituted as a science by resolving
philosophical questions through literary procedures. Nevertheless, history
fails to acknowledge these procedures. This applies to the problem of
anachronism in the following way: anachronism is a poetic concept that
serves as a philosophical rule for the question of the status of truth in the
historian’s discourse.
Having set this out, we can return to our quotation and to the first
question to which it gives rise. Why this negative privilege of anachronism?
To understand this, first of all we must ask, in the first analysis, what is the
minimal meaning of this word. The Robert dictionary summarises it thus:
“Action de placer un fait, un usage, un personnage, etc., dans
une époque autre que l’époque à laquelle ils appartiennent ou
conviennent réellement [The act of placing a fact, a use, a character,
etc. in a time other than the time to which it really belongs or to
which it is really suited].”
This definition poses a first problem. According to the primary meaning
of the prefix ana-, which describes a movement from the rear toward the
front, from one time toward an earlier, anachronism is the mistake that
consists of putting a fact too early. In good logical fashion, there must
be a symmetrical mistake that consists of putting a fact too late. In fact,
nineteenth-century dictionaries attest to just such an attempt at lexical
rationalisation. Faced with the sin of anachronism, they invent that of
parachronism. They even invent a general concept of metachronism, of
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which “prochronism” and “parachronism” are particular types. Yet these
rationalisations do not last long. Anachronism has remained alone to
indicate the mistake against chronology in general.
What is the reason for this privilege? For me, one must look for it in
the double sense of ana-. This prefix indicates another movement, from
below to above. A hypothesis can be deduced from this: anachronism is so
called because what is at stake is not only a problem of succession. It is not a
horizontal problem of the order of times but a vertical problem of the order
of time in the hierarchy of beings. It is a problem of the division (partage) of
time, in the sense of “what one receives as one’s share” (ce que l’on reçoit en
partage).3 The question of anachronism concerns what truth time has as it
is divided, in a vertical order that connects time to what is above it, that is to
say, what one ordinarily calls eternity.
To break down the terms of the problem, anachronism, let us say, does
not concern the simple turning back (la remontée) from one date toward
another. It concerns moving on from (la remontée) this time of dates toward
that which is not the time of dates.4 This movement indicates two different
relations, which I will examine in turn. It is, first of all, a movement toward
the time that one cannot date, the time of legends. The European humanist
tradition has known three great chronologies: the Christian chronology
defined by the birth of Jesus Christ, the Roman chronology ab urbe condita,
and the Greek chronology linked to the Olympiads.5 However, anachronism
first of all concerned this junction of times. It consisted of an overlapping
of legendary times with those of a certified chronology (whatever its
exactitude might be). The major example of anachronism mentioned in the
classical age is that of which Virgil writes, the loves of Dido and Aeneas. It
could be noted that anachronism, the mistake against history par excellence,
concerns two perfectly fictional characters, lacking any historical reality.
The reason for this apparent strangeness is simple. Anachronism, before
defining the requirements of the historian, defines those of poetry and
fiction. The fault of Virgil is not to have put what is after before (Carthage
before the time of the Trojan War). It is to have put together two times
that come under two different regimes of truth and define two different
requirements for fiction. The Trojan War and Aeneas belong to legendary
23 Jacques Rancière The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth

3. Trans. The verb
partager means both to
divide and to share out.
Here, Rancière uses
both senses.

4. Trans. Rancière here
uses the numerous
senses of the noun la
remontée, which can
mean an upstream
journey on a river,
some process of
catching up or going
back up, or a recovery.
‘Remonter du temps’
means to go back in
time
5. Trans. Ab urbe
condita (AUB), “from
the founding of the
City (Rome),” that is,
from the year 753 BCE.
AUB was the system
of dating used by preChristian Rome.
.

6. Concerning these
debates, see in
particular the work of
William Nelson, Fact or
Fiction: The Dilemma of
the Renaissance Story
Teller, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1973)

7. Trans. The theologian
Jacques-Bénigne
Bossuet was a
renowned preacher
and in 1670 was
appointed tutor to
the Dauphin, eldest
son of Louis XIV of
France. His Discourse
on Universal History
was published in 1682.
The standard English
translation by Elborg
Forster, edited and
with an introduction
by Orest Ranum, was
published in 1976 by

times. The foundation of Carthage, even if it predates that of Rome, falls
under Roman chronology. Concerning the time of Aeneas, the poet has
total freedom, on condition only that he does not contradict Homer. But
this is not at all the same concerning the time of Carthage, which cannot be
married to any time whatsoever.
Thus anachronism comes under the truth of poetry before it comes
under that of the scholar. And it is in the debate on the rights of fiction that
the characteristics of this concept inherited by historians will be defined.6
The lively debates of the sixteenth century concerning the rights of poets
produce an essential rule: the rights of fiction are inversely proportional to
temporal proximity. The closer one is to the present, the less one can invent,
and the more fictional invention approaches the limit of the verifiable lie.
The debate on poetics reveals the idea of an essential relation between the
truth and the present, the scientific consequences of which we will see.
The above concerned the movement of historic times toward legendary
times. But the essential relation plays out in another movement. The sin
against the order of succession of historic time refers to another sin, that
is, the sin against the hierarchical order according to which the times of
succession depend upon a time that ignores succession. Chronological time
depends upon a time without chronology: a pure present, or eternity. As
we have already seen, anachronism is not the confusion of dates but the
confusion of epochs. Yet epochs are not simply cut out from the continuity
of successions. Epochs mark instead specific regimes of truth, relations
of the order of time to order that is not in time. At the beginning of
Discourse on Universal History, Bossuet teaches his royal student the need to
distinguish between times.7 That means, first of all, to distinguish between
what belongs to the time of natural law, written law, or evangelical law. An
epoch is, then, a cut-out (découpage) from time determined within an
economy of revelation and an economy of the manner in which the eternal
deploys truth and makes it known in time.
The Christian economy of revelation is an economy of the redemption
of error [une économie du rachat de la faute]. But, behind the redemption of
error in time, there is the question of the redemption of time itself. Behind
the relation of fallible, mortal man to Eternity, there is the relation of the
24 In/Print June 2015

order of becoming to the order of that which is always identical to itself.
That is to say, in brief, the relation between Chronos and Æon, between time
and eternity. Behind the Bible and Saint Augustine, there is the Timaeus
and the formula that history retains from it, even if it is not literally exact:
“Time is the mobile image of immobile eternity.”8 The formula gives its
precise meaning to the idea of the “redemption of time” (rachat du temps).
To redeem time (racheter le temps)—to redeem the error and falsity of
becoming—is to make time as “similar” as possible to that which it copies:
the eternity of Æon. The truthfulness of history depends, before any
concern with “method,” upon this act of redemption. Yet to redeem time
cannot mean to put it in order according to the law of succession, since it is
precisely the constraint of succession that makes time dissimilar to eternity.
On the contrary, it is to abolish succession as such and to put in its place
an image as similar as possible to the eternity of truth. It is to oppose time
as a totality to time as a heterogeneity of successive parts. There are two
privileged images of the identity of truth in time. The first is the causal order
that puts the sequence of cause and effect in place of the simple before and
after of events. The second is permanence, time coagulated into epochs,
each defined as the law of immanence of its own phenomena.
The first image, the first form of the redemption of time, substitutes
for the successive order of events the logical order of their reciprocal
implication. What Polybius, in the second century BCE, calls their symploke
(‘entwinement’). The work of the historian, as Polybius is the first to define,
is to manifest this symploke that makes it so that there is not one event
and then another, but rather, a meaningful totality. It is very clear that
when Polybius defines these conditions he has in mind a particular text by
Aristotle: not the Physics, but the Poetics. The theory of symploke responds
to the Aristotelian hierarchy between philosophy, poetry, and history. Poetry
is, Aristotle says, more philosophical than history. Indeed, history is the
domain of kath’ hekaston, of “one by one,” which informs us that there
is just one thing and then another. As for poetry, it is the domain of the
general, of the katholon (‘relating to the whole’) that places actions under
a single, articulated totality. And there are two ways to constitute it, either
according to necessity or according to verisimilitude (vraisemblance). There
25 Jacques Rancière The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth

University of
Chicago Press.

8. Trans. Rancière here
refers to the Socratic
dialogue. The relevant
section, which Rancière
paraphrases rather
than quotes directly, is
37c–38b.

9. Trans. There are two
meanings of l’intrigue
in use here, both as a
‘puzzle’ or ‘enigma,’ but
also, a meaning that is
lost from the word in
English, as a ‘plot.’

Such is the first way to redeem time and to ground history in truth. It
consists of subsuming time under the plot of a necessary series [of events].
I now arrive at the second way, which leads us to the heart of our initial
question. It is a matter always of constituting time as a whole, but with this
second figure, it is not a matter of thinking this whole as the interweaving
of causes and effects according to a principle of transcendence. It is a matter
of constituting time itself as the principle of immanence that subsumes
all phenomena under a law of interiority. The truth of history is then the
immanence of time as the principle of co-presence and co-belonging of
phenomena. Time thus functions as that which is similar to or substitutes
for eternity. It doubles up, being the principle of presence—and so of
eternity—interior to the temporality of phenomena. This second way is
at the heart of the modern definition of the scientific nature of history (la
scientificité de l’histoire). And for this [reason] history places at its heart the
question of anachronism as mortal sin, a sin against the presence of eternity
in time, the presence of eternity as time.
To illustrate the above propositions, we can return to the sentence from

Lucien Febvre that served as our point of departure. Cofounder of Annales
and founding father of the French historical school, Febvre is, as is well
known, the incarnation of a certain modern paradigm of the scientific
nature of history. It is also known that this foundation rests upon a number
of principles of theoretical rupture. The first affirms the rupture with the socalled history of events, that of the Aristotelian kath’ hekaston materialised
by the succession of princes, battles, and treatises, told according to their
princely chroniclers. In passing, one can remark that the sin of anachronism
cannot be, without contradicting this rupture, a matter of erroneous
chronology and of dates ahead of time. The second principle breaks with
the first form of redemption from the contingency of historical events
(rachat de l’événementialité). Inaugurated by Polybius and perfected by Saint
Augustine and Bossuet, this form makes of history a providential series.
Between the eighteenth century and nineteenth century, this providential
history is rationalised. At first, it takes the secularised form of universal
history as the history of the progressive development of the human spirit,
and then it takes the scientific form of causes necessarily drawn from the
conditions of human action. However, the scientific historical paradigm
of Annales also refutes this scientific nature of history in terms of laws and
causes. What, then, defines the scientific nature of historical discourse?
Traditional descriptions define it by two inversions of perspective, along
the two axes of diachrony and synchrony. Upon the first axis is imposed
the long time of cycles and structures against the short time of events. The
second axis opposes to the history of princes, battles, and treatises, the
thickness of the social, the interweaving of ways of doing, being, and
thinking, from the elementary core of productive and reproductive activities
up to the more or less elaborate forms of representation through which
humans live out their relation to these elementary conditions.
My hypothesis is that this double privileging, of long time over short
time and of the thickness of the social over the superficiality of events, is
first of all the privileging of a certain type of time: a time that acts as the
measure (l’efficace) of its own truth, the measure of the eternity that is
hidden within it. I want to show this by starting from the particular object
of Lucien Febvre’s book, the question of Rabelais’ “religion.” This book
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is a theoretical superiority of poetry, which sets up a likely (vraisemblable)
connection between fictive events, over history, which says exactly that
there was some verified event, then another, and then another.
A significant consequence emerges from this, which disturbs somewhat
the honest teleologies of the conquest of scientific truths over the fantasies
of poetic fiction. The promotion of history as discourse of truth comes
out of its capacity to make itself similar to poetry, to imitate for its own
benefit the power of poetic generality. This is exactly what Polybius does
when he constitutes for science a philosophical intrigue (intrigue) of the
future, the intrigue of necessity. He has to recount a slice of fifty years
marked by the successive victories of the Romans over the Carthaginians
and the Macedonians. To do a scholarly history consists, then, of showing
that the successive victories and violent expansion of the Roman Empire
are not works of chance but of providence. So, the truth regime of history is
constituted in a specific connection between the poetic logic of a necessary
or likely plot (intrigue) and a “theological” logic of the manifestation of the
order of divine truth in the order of human time.9

10. Febvre, Le
problème de
l’incroyance, 307.

comes about due to an apparently quite short term circumstance, namely
Abel Lefranc’s preface to his own edition of Pantagruel. According to this
latter, the forms of Rabelaisian parody hide a demolition of Christian
religion. Lucien Febvre seeks to refute this thesis, which makes of Rabelais a
non-believer obliged, quite simply, by the constraints of his time to mask his
non-belief in the ambivalences of parody. But Febvre’s problem is, of course,
not to clear Rabelais of the charge of atheism. It is to refute the conception
of history that supports Abel Lefranc’s claims, a conception according to
which, in a given epoch, there are people who are in advance of their time.
It is to combat anachronism. Only, let us take note, anachronism is not a
question of facts. It is a question of thought.
Lucien Febvre’s thesis is, therefore, the following: it is wrong to make
of Rabelais a non-believer in disguise because that would be anachronistic.
That would make contemporary to Rabelais’ time a thought that does not
belong to it. What Abel Lefranc does, Febvre tells us, is to “commit the
most serious and the most ridiculous of all anachronisms: in the realm of
ideas it is like giving Diogenes an umbrella and Mars a machine gun.”10
The comparison is striking, but obviously specious. We have enough
information to assure us that in the time of Diogenes they did not use
umbrellas and that in the time of the sculptures and figurines of Mars
they did not use machine guns. Therefore we can say with confidence
that Diogenes did not have an umbrella and Roman generals did not have
machine guns available to them. To say, on the other hand, that Rabelais had
not in mind the idea that the Christian religion was an immense joke poses
completely different problems of verification. Yet it is precisely at this point,
where the domain of the verifiable comes to an end, that the accusation
of anachronism comes into play. The accusation of anachronism is not
the claim that something did not exist at a given date. It is the claim that
something could not have existed at this date.
This is indeed how Lucien Febvre proceeds. His initial question could
be formulated as follows: is it true that Rabelais was a non-believer? But,
he tells us, the formulation of this questions sounds like an examining
magistrate. The scholar formulates the question differently: is it possible
that he was a non-believer? And the historian shapes and temporalises

this logical formula in the following way: Was it possible that he was not a
believer?
Thus formulated, the question calls for an almost automatic response.
Rabelais could not have been a non-believer. And why not? Not because
we know that he was not one. We know nothing of what he thought deep
down. He could not have been a non-believer because, to be one, it would
have been necessary that it was possible for him to be one. And for that, it
would have been necessary that the possibility of this possibility existed. The
question, Lucien Febvre tells us, is not to know whether or not it was easy to
be a non-believer in the sixteenth century. At all times, there are “hot heads”
(cerveaux brûlés) who allow themselves to affirm or to deny whatsoever
they choose, which is why they also end up as burnt bodies (corps brûlés).
Hot heads who do not know what is possible and what is impossible prove
nothing. One must, therefore, keep to the strict form of the question: “Let us
not inquire whether a break was easy, but whether or not conditions were
met that could have made a break possible.”11 To this question, the response
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is negative: the conditions of possibility for this possibility were not in place
during Rabelais’ time. Why not? Quite simply, because he did not have
time for it. The reality of empirical time confirms the impossibility which is
registered in time as a transcendental condition. The “epoch” of Rabelais did
not allow him non-belief, because the empirical time, of which the “epoch”
itself is the transcendental principle, was a time completely determined in
its “uses” by the Christian religion. This is what Lucien Febvre shows us
when he sets out the conditions of individualisation and socialisation of
some ordinary individual:
A child is born. He lives. Without delay, they take him to the church
and baptise him whilst the bells ring, which are themselves baptised
by the bishop [...] A man dies. Whether or not his funeral services
are arranged in his will (and those who shirk this obligation are rare),
he is buried “as he must be,” in the Christian manner, in his family
tomb [or] more often in some monastic church of the Dominicans,
the Franciscans, or the Carmelites; and without social distinction,
whether [he is] a baron or simple artisan. Could one refuse oneself
a Christian burial? This was impossible, and unthinkable [...] Man

11. Ibid. 335.
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eats, and religion surrounds his diet of prescriptions, rites, and
prohibitions [...] They are ill. They fear sickness. Certainly, the
doctor is there to relieve patients. But the true recovery depends
upon God, whether directly or by the mediation of the Saints of
Paradise. And if it concerns an epidemic, especially the plague, what
then? Quick, pilgrimages and vows to Saint Sebastian [...] The legacy
is that there is nothing in all Christendom that does not begin with
an invocation and a sign of the cross.12
In brief, private life, professional life, public life, all have their time
completely determined and articulated by religion. That goes both for the
ordinariness of days and for the extraordinariness of events. The conclusion
is obvious:
This religion, Christianity, is the coat of the Merciful Virgin Mary, so
often represented in this way in our churches. All men, in all states,
take shelter beneath this coat. It is impossible to want to escape from
this coat. Huddled beneath these maternal folds, men do not feel
that they are captive. To rebel, it would be necessary first of all to
surprise oneself.13
Rabelais’ time does not allow him not to believe, because the form of
this time is identical with the form of belief. Belonging to a time determines
for mortals the very fact that they exist. Yet this belonging to a time is
strictly identical to belonging to a belief. To not believe in the belief of his
time would have meant for Rabelais to not exist. This presents itself in the
form of a simple alternative: either Rabelais did not exist or he believed. Yet
he existed, so he believed.
Of course, Lucien Febvre is not naive. He understands well that this
shows a gap in his argument:
However, let us imagine an exceptional man. One of those few men
that shows himself capable of being ahead of his contemporaries by
a century, of formulating truths that will only be accepted as such
fifty, sixty, or a hundred years later.14
But to unburden (soulever) oneself of the belief system of one’s time, one
must have, he tells us, a lever (un levier). And where would Rabelais have
found such a thing? Neither the philosophy nor the science of his time gave
33 Jacques Rancière The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth

12. Ibid. 309, 310, 312,
313, 314

13. Ibid. 323

14. Ibid.
.

15. Ibid. 324.

16. Ibid.

17. Trans. Marc Bloch,
Apologie pour l’histoire,
ou métier d’historien,
(Paris: Armand Colin,
1949), 18. Translated as
The Historian’s Craft,
(New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1953).
18. Ibid. 22.

(by the principle of co-presence) and not their parents (by the principle of
succession), beings defined not by the vagaries [aléa] of successions, bodily
and intellectual, but by contemporaneity with “their” time, beings that carry
their time on their bodies, in all their ways of being and doing, and who
carry it in their soul under the name of belief.
Earlier, I mentioned the formula on time taken from the Timaeus: “the
mobile image of immobile eternity.” Yet, in the same text, this analogy finds
itself completed by another, formulated thus: “What essence is to becoming,
truth is to belief.”19 For Plato, of course, the analogy tends toward the

him the supports necessary for that. As a consequence, it was impossible for
him to put together a system of reasons sufficiently solid and well-supported
to insist upon an effective negation of this Christianity that was the form for
the organisation of the life of each and every one. In brief, so that Rabelais
could be a precursor [of free thinking], he already would have needed his
own precursors. It would have been necessary that the conditions of free
thought—a free thought worthy of the name—existed for Rabelais to be
able to be a free thinker. Yet they did not exist. And the alternative is posed
anew: either Rabelais was not a non-believer, or he was a non-believer but
without sufficient reason for being so. Consequently, his non-belief was only
the individual fantasy of a hot-head. This fantasy was not non-belief of his
time, in his time. It had no historical consistency.
It hardly deserves to be discussed, any more than the sneers of the
drunkard in the tavern who guffaws when he is told that the earth is moving,
under him and with him, at such a speed that it cannot even be felt.15
If there existed at the beginning of the sixteenth century someone called
Rabelais who did not believe in Christianity, his non-belief was not an
object of history. “And from that point on, nothing remains for the historian
but to forget all about it, and to leave Rabelais there.”16
To be an object of history is, therefore, to believe in the belief “of one’s
time,” to belong to one’s time by the mode of belief, by the mode of unfailing
adherence. This is what we are told by Febvre’s alter ego, Marc Bloch, in a
formula that appears anodyne, but is nothing of the sort: “History is the
science of men in time.”17 Marc Bloch liked to illustrate this with an Arab
proverb: “Men resemble their time more than they resemble their parents.”18
One must give these formulae a strongly theoretical meaning. They tell us
this: For history to be a science, which is to say, so that it gains something
of eternity, its time must as far as possible resemble eternity. How does a
time resemble eternity? In being a pure present. For time to be redeemed
there must be a pure present, a principle of the co-presence of historical
subjects. Historical subjects must “resemble” their time, which is to say, they
must resemble the principle of their co-presence. Two conditions therefore
go together. Firstly, a time that is the principle not of succession but of
simultaneity, of co-presence, and secondly, beings who resemble their time

opposition of two worlds of a radically unequal ontological content. For
the historian, on the other hand, the eternity of simultaneity finds itself
at home in the time of successions, as this latter’s principle of interiority.
Which is to say that “belief ” will become the very mark of this truth lodged
in time itself. Belief is nothing other than the subjective form of time. It is
the resemblance of the historical agent to his time, and this resemblance is
precisely the ersatz eternity that confirms for the historian’s discourse its
position in truth. It is where time imposes its presence as belief that time
resembles eternity. In an exemplary fashion, the everyday time of Rabelais
does not allow time not to believe. It does not allow the time to not be of
one’s time.
We now understand just what is at stake in the proscription of
anachronism: this knotting of time and belief that assures the redemption
of time and, therefore, the “truth” of the historian’s discourse. We also
better understand the unpardonable character of the “sin of anachronism,”
by comparing Febvre’s analysis to that of an historian whose declared
Nietzscheanism should place him in complete opposition to the solid
radical-socialist rationalism of Febvre. That historian is Paul Veyne. When,
in his book Bread and Circuses, Veyne analyses the institution of charitable
practices in antique Rome, he raises in passing the question of Christian
charity as it is expressed not in the speculations of theology but in the
original freshness of the Sermon on the Mount. Looking at it with the eyes
of a historian, Veyne tells us that there is nothing original to the evangelical
ideal expressed by these texts. This ideal was already the common
good—the belief—of the Jews at the time of Jesus. Consequently, nascent
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19. Trans. Timaeus
29c: Zeyl’s translation
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Christianity could not fail to endorse it, for two reasons. The first is that,
taking into account the state of the general mood, “no popular preacher
would have been listened to if he had not done the same.” The second, and
most fundamental, is that no preacher could even have the idea to stray
from this mood:
And why should [Jesus] not have adopted it? He himself was only
a man of the people, a member of the crowd that from below looks
in awe at those who, in their palaces, live in honour and luxury [...]
As for evangelical morality so for universalism: one should not ask
questions that a man of the people, as brilliant as he might be, could
not ask himself.20
In brief, in all epochs, one could only be a believer, which is to say,
contemporary to one’s time. Jesus could only be a Jew of his time, Rabelais
a Christian of his. In other words, Christianity has no more reason to be
born at the time of the first than to die at the time of the second. To me, this
text [Bread and Circuses] seems to summarise in an exemplary fashion the
displacement of the status of truth that defines modern historical science.
At the time of the Enlightenment and of critique, the question was asked:
Is there a verifiable historical reality to what the Evangelists told us, or is
it only a matter of fables? What testimonies do we have that an individual
named Jesus had at that time spoken those words and accomplished those
miraculous acts that the Evangelists attribute to him? In no time at all, the
modern historian upsets the game and imposes another idea of truth: not
“Is it true that...?” but “Was it possible not to...?” The word of the Evangelists
is true because it was impossible for any contemporary of Jesus to say
something other than what is said by the Evangelists. Belief is to truth what
becoming is to essence. It is the necessity of belief that confirms the truth
of science, which is to say, in Platonic terms, the presence of essence in
becoming.
Of course, this confirmation has a very specific form. Belief is the object
of science. The mark of analogical relation is also the mark of knowledge.
For the historical agent, to resemble one’s time is to resemble it in the mode
of belief, which means to not know one’s time. To be made of one’s time
is to be made in ignorance. It is on the other side, the side of the scholar,
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that the “resemblance” of belief is known for what it is. The time of the
historical agent, as Febvre tells it, is a pure present. But the time of the
scholar who alone knows this present for what it is, he is above this present
(un surprésent), a more-than-present (un plus-que-présent) who retains
resemblance [to his time] but eliminates its identity with ignorance.
The resemblance of man to his time, the impossibility of him to think
otherwise to what his time makes thinkable, then becomes the allegory for
the relation of science to its object. One who believes is, in Platonic terms,
one who does not know. It makes an allegory of the difference between the
science of the scholar and the ignorance of the one who does not know
(l’ignorance de l’ignorant), the ignorance of the object of science. The theory
of time implied by the denunciation of anachronism therefore has a double
power. On the one hand, it redeems time. As far as possible, it makes time
similar to eternity. Those who are conditioned by time, it fixes with the
identity of belief/resemblance. In this sense, it guarantees for the first time
the truth of history. But it does this a second time by giving to science, as a
specific object, its other, which is to say, the being made of time, therefore of
belief, and therefore of ignorance. Temporal “resemblance” normalises both
the science of the scholar and the ignorance of the one who does not know.
It therefore knots together the constraint of truth with a social constraint. I
made reference above to the formulae in the Timaeus about the mobile time
image of eternity. But, in the fictional construction of the Platonic dialogues,
the Timaeus follows on from another dialogue, the Republic. In the Republic,
time plays a particular role of division. There are those who have time
and those who do not have time. In Book II, it is time, or more precisely,
the absence of time, the absence of another time, that fixes the artisans in
their place. They do not have the time, Socrates says, to occupy themselves
with anything but their “own affairs,” the tasks that correspond to their
nature and their function. Time thus assures the equivalence of a social
distribution and an epistemic distribution. It separates the different ways
in which to take part in the task of the city, thereby imitating the eternity of
justice in the time of human affairs. On the one hand, there are those who
have time to concern themselves with contemplation of the divine model
and the forms of its temporal realisation. On the other hand, there are those

who have not the time for this, and who, as a consequence, only imitate
eternity passively, by the fact of not having the time to do anything but the
work to which their nature predestines them.
In the time of historical science, of course, there is no longer a Platonic
tripartite division of classes. But there remains the divisional function
assigned to time. There remains this remarkable relation of truth to time, in
a double sense: the order of the imitation of truth in time and the division
between those who know and those who do not know. In the order of
historical knowledge, this “belief,” which cannot be other than what it
is, is the strict equivalent of that sophrosyne (‘self-control’) that was, for
Plato, the unique virtue of the third class, a virtue without any content
other than the simple subordination of those who cannot be anywhere
else but in their place. The scientific city of the modern human and social
sciences is modelled on the Platonic philosophical city. In this city, the
relation of the temporal order to the order of eternity must be assured by
specialists according to a strict distribution. What threatens the Platonic
philosophical city are the artisans who escape their condition, who want to
occupy themselves with more than their “own affairs,” and engage with the
affairs of the city, even the affairs of philosophy. Likewise, what threatens
the scientific city of history are words and thoughts that leave behind the
strict obedience to belief similar to time. What threatens is the fact that the
ordinariness of productive and reproductive life is seized and divided by
the power of words that separate bodies from their destiny. What threatens
is heresy, in the original meaning of the word, namely separation, life
separated from itself by the power of words that short-circuit the strong
relation of time to eternity as the exact distribution both of bodies in the
city and of objects for science. What assures and reassures this threatened
order is belief, in the strong sense of the term: the state of one who cannot
not think what his or her time alone presents as thinkable. Consider these
ritual phrases that scatter works on the history of mentalities, dealing
with the belief of men of the medieval or classical epochs: “How would
they have?” “How would they have not?” These are phrases that make up
a regime of evidence incapable of stating itself theoretically as such. The
regulation of time that history needs to assure its regime of scientificity is a
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philosophical problem that is regulated, not philosophically, but poetically.
Febvre’s book effectively gives a demonstration of this. Here, the doubling of
time that gives truth to the knowledge of belief is never theorised as such. It
is carried out, without being thematised, in the order of narration itself. The
description of this sixteenth-century universe that does not allow non-belief
thus uses a double poetic procedure concerning, in classical terms, dispositio
and elocutio.
From dispositio comes a manner of composing a picture in such a way
that the “anachronic” element—non-belief—appears there as an element
visually incompatible with others, such as with a colour that clashes or a
piece that is not cut from the same material. The “anachronic,” remember,
is that which does not belong to or does not suit the time in which it is
found. Where non-belonging cannot be demonstrated, which is to say when
it is a matter of knowing what is and what is not in someone’s head, one
appeals to what is unsuitable (la non-convenance). The demonstration of
the “anachronic” happens, then, according to a well-established poetic logic
of verisimilitude and its absence. But verisimilitude, like truth, has changed
regime since the Romantic age. In the time of Voltaire and La Harpe, the
rules of verisimilitude to which the representation of some historical
character or the painting of some era had to submit were clearly explained.
In the time of Lucien Febvre, the demonstration [of the “anachronic”]
no longer has to be argued according to rules. It is carried out directly.
Description requires the sensible evidence of what is in place in the picture
and what is not. In the description of the everyday life of a man of the
sixteenth century, non-belief has the status of a detail that does not fit. It
would be like portraying a rude medieval lord in perfumed fineries.
The second procedure [elocutio] has a syntactical order. It consists of
the creation of a more-than-present. “A child is born. He lives. Without
delay, they take him to the church.” One must understand, of course, if he
lives—which means, if he does not die at birth as did so many children—
then they take him to the church. But clearly this if would be unwelcome.
It would slow down the story and introduce an element of chance into
its purely assertory structure. If one suppresses it [this if ], statistically
uncertain survival becomes life. Not the life of this particular child, but
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life in general; life, the power of self-confirmation that makes itself
evident as the identity of what is actual and what is possible. “This” child
is placed in a present where the general rule and its particular illustration
are indiscernible. The same goes for “a dead man,” where one must hear:
“Let us take the case of a man who has just died,” or indeed “The plague
strikes? Processions.” A modal and temporal system is deployed here,
imperiously governed by a time—the present of the indicative—and even
by a quasi-time, a detemporalised time, essentialised and made similar
to the identity of eternity, similar to the absence of time. It is the time of
the nominal phrase. “To refuse oneself a Christian burial? Impossible and
unthinkable.” The phrase “normal” would say more or less the same thing:
he could not imagine refusing a Christian burial, for him that would have
been unthinkable. But to place this impossibility in the past is already to
reduce it, to assign to it only the slightest existence. It would be better to
write, in the spoken present of narration, “He cannot refuse...” Better again
is simply to write “Impossible,” which is to suppress every temporal mark,
every verbal mark, to make better felt how the time of Rabelais defined
immediately the being of those who inhabited it, or who are inhabited by
it. By this technique of the more-than-present that culminates in non-time,
the existence of each and every one finds itself established as immediately
identical to its essence. In other words, the description of the empirical case
is established to be similar to the statement of the general rule.
This temporal system noticeably clouds the opposition, made by
Benveniste, between the system of discourse dominated by the present and
the system of the story dominated by the past. According to this opposition,
it is admissible to set down history as a mixture that narrates in the system
of the past and explains in the system of the present.21 Yet Lucien Febvre
presents us with a completely different articulation of the relation between
the syntax of history and its semantics. He gives us a story that by the fact
of being in the present—even the more-than-present—is already by itself
the presentation of its own meaning. We know that he borrows this mode
of account from [Jules] Michelet, the one who formulated the redemptionist
programme of history. The historian is the character who crosses the river
of the dead in order to redeem (racheter) at the same time the past, the
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unknown, and death. Febvre himself no longer needs this programme, no
longer needs to dramatise the relation of the truth of history to the nontruth of time. It is rather that he has at hand the product of Michelet’s
operation, a product from which the process has disappeared, namely, the
story in the present, which abolishes at the same time the non-truth of
words and of time. This shows the triumph of the present or of presence
and the immanence of meaning in the body of what is presented. Such is the
story of the Fête de la Fédération of the 14th of July 1790, when the talkative
but mute stories (les récits muets-bavards) of the village writers vanish
in favour of the picture that, in their place, gives voice to the immanent
meaning of life, a picture of the forces of nature at the time of harvests
and flowers.22 It is this mode of story/discourse that imposes itself anew in
the short phrases that make us see, in the everyday life of the man of the
Renaissance, the absence of what it excludes: namely, the possibility that
Rabelais could have been a non-believer.
Anachronism therefore concerns something quite other than a matter
of defective chronology. It is the symbol-concept (le concept-emblème) by
which history affirms its specificity and its scientificity. Anachronism is
the symbol of a concept and a usage of time where this latter has absorbed,
without trace, the properties of its contrary, eternity. The first paradox
is that this mark of scientific difference is borrowed from the arsenal of
poetics and rhetoric. A poetics of verisimilitude operating in these tableaux
vivants shows us the impossibility that a thought make its home in a scene
to which it does not belong. This poetics, we have said, regulates [thought]
without posing the question of the relation of truth to speech and to time.
But it regulates [thought] also by making itself invisible, by disappearing
in the production of an immediate presence of concept in existence. The
philosophical question [of whether or not thought fully belongs to its
time] is hidden in the poetic resolution. But this poetic resolution is
hidden in turn to make of the evidence of anachronism a clandestine
ontological argument. Time, the principle of the co-presence of the
phenomena to which it is present, becomes the very form of possibility of
these phenomena. To exist is to belong to or to “suit” a time. It is to “suit” a
concept of time identified with the principle of sufficient reason. It is to suit
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a philosophical principle of sufficient reason identified, in the last instance,
with the old argument of the possible and the impossible around which the
birth of rhetoric was carried out and by which it asserted its control. “How
could it have been?” The elaboration of this question to make up for an
unattributable truth establishes the legal power of rhetoric. “How could it
not have been?” This is the philosophised form of the rhetorical argument,
which now becomes an ontological argument, in which historical science,
under the guise of good method, finally encloses truth and submits it to a
time identified with the possible. Poetic procedures have enclosed eternity
in time. In turn, time is made the condition of belonging to or suiting this
eternity. At the end of the process, the eternity of the true is led back into
the service of rhetorical argument, which in order to declare that something
does not exist only needs to argue the impossibility of this existence. Under
the guise of freeing science from the “truth” of judges, it is, in the final
instance, to the verisimilitude of lawyers that science is now delivered.
We know the drift of this argument. Negationism is only the provocative
form of this shameful ontological argument that submits historical existence
to this “possibility according to the time,” which itself submits the principle
of sufficient reason to the comforts of rhetoric.23 But one must draw out
the consequences. Negationism is not simply a perverse effect, due to
a vicious diversion of anti-anachronic precaution. It is the concept of
anachronism that is, in itself, perverse. It is the submission of existence to
the possible that is, at its core, anti-historical. The historian does not have to
pronounce verdicts of inexistence in accordance with impossibilities whose
status is indefinite. Above all, he does not have to identify the conditions
of possibility and impossibility for the form of time. It is the very idea of
anachronism as error about time that must be deconstructed. To say that
Diogenes had an umbrella is simply, in so far as we know, an error about
the accessories available to Athenians in the fourth century BCE. There is
no particular reason to put this in a specific class of errors that would be
“errors against time.” To say that Rabelais was a non-believer is a hypothesis
that our knowledge about the forms of belief of his time and about his own
biography allows us to hold in great suspicion. To say, on the other hand,
that he could not have being [a non-believer] because his time denied the
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possibility of non-belief is to make an unwarranted use of the category of
the possible and, likewise, the category of time.
To deconstruct the category of anachronism is to undo a double knot:
the knot of time with the possible and its knot with the eternal. It is, first of
all, to free historical rationality from the clandestine games of the possible.
It is also to undo this time from the co-presence that, on the one hand,
clandestinely places eternity in time and, on the other hand, makes of this
eternalised time a principle of possibility and impossibility. The concept
of “anachronism” is anti-historical because it obscures the very conditions
of all historicity. There is history insofar as men do not “resemble” their
time, insofar as they act in breach of “their” time, in breach of the line of
temporality that puts them in their place by obliging them to “use” their
time in some way or other. But this rupture is itself only possible because of
the possibility to connect this line of temporality with others and because of
the multiplicity of lines of temporality present in any “one” time.
It is this play of heterogeneous temporal series that, to refer here to my
own experience, I have tried to highlight in La nuit des prolétaires.24 With
this book, it was a matter of questioning the connection between time,
the possible and truth which was affirmed by the traditional definition
of proletarian as “worker in heavy industry.” According to this definition,
“proletarian” was the concept for an existence that was only possible at a
precise moment in the course of history. It was explained that until the
Industrial Revolution had attained a certain point, there could have been no
true proletarians. It was therefore necessary to await the time in question up
to the point where it appeared that this time had passed.
My own hypothesis was that, for reasons strictly opposed to the above,
“proletarian” was the name of a historical agent and a historical mode of
“making history.” It was the name for a rupture of the resemblance between
workers and “their” time, the time of the ordinary cycle of time, the cycle
of the day devoted to work and the night devoted to rest, which prevented
workers from doing, in Platonic terms, anything other than what they
should. It was, strictly speaking, a reversal of “their” time, and it was the
connection of this topsy-turvy time with other lines of temporality: the
new line of history, linked to the idea of history as a process in the making
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(processus d’un faire), and born of the rupture with continuity already
accomplished by the revolutions in England, America, and France; the
progressive time of the new palingenetic religions; but also the broken time
that characterises the life of words, sentences, and meaning. “Proletarian”
is, in fact, a word with a curious history. In a text of the second century CE,
the Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, the modern reader is surprised to find a
chapter entitled “Qui sit proletarius?” He is even more surprised to find
this text devoted to a discussion among erudite Romans about the possible
meaning of this word that, at their time, had gone completely out of use. By
studying old texts, these scholars end up finding the meaning of this archaic
term in the Law of the Twelve Tables, the founding text of ancient Roman
legislation. Proletarius, they discover, comes from proles, which signifies
race and descent. In the first Roman age, the term refers to those men who
do nothing other than live and make children without giving them a name,
an identity, or a symbolic status within the city.
This ancient discussion about an out of use word is apt to make us
understand why, in the modern age, the name of proletarian has been
suitable to refer specifically to the rupture with the temporal logic of
production and reproduction. But the length of time that this word, which
in the second century of our Christian era could scarcely be understood by
scholars, has been forgotten, has given this word the power to name a new
connection of times. It now links the time of rupture with the banality of
works and days, with the future of new times, and with the broken time that
characterises the life of words and meaning.
There is no anachronism. But there are modes of connection that in
a positive sense we can call anachronies: events, ideas, significations that
are contrary to time, that make meaning circulate in a way that escapes
any contemporaneity, any identity of time with “itself.” An anachrony is a
word, an event, or a signifying sequence that has left “its” time, and in this
way is given the capacity to define completely original points of orientation
(les aiguillages), to carry out leaps from one temporal line to another.25
And it is because of these points of orientation, these jumps and these
connections that there exists a power to “make” history. The multiplicity of
temporal lines, even of senses of time, included in the “same” time is the
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condition of historical activity. Effective consideration of this should be the
departure point for a historical science, less concerned with its “scientific”
respectability and more concerned with what “history” means.
In response
Brian Fay To respond briefly to Rancière’s expansive text is a difficult task.
An essay so broad in scope, one that literally moves from pre-chronology
to eternity, offers many diverse avenues to pursue. What strikes me most
forcibly is Rancière’s proposition that time can be considered in and through
a vertical divisible framework. This leads me to speculate what this framing
might hold for the artist, via its consequences for the historian.
Rancière suggests that the prefix ana- offers us a vertical structuring
of time, where time and the anachronic action can be understood as a
move from below to above. This structuring is somewhat unusual. Our
general understanding and indeed diagrammatic depictions of temporality
usually configure time as a horizontally orientated schema, with the
‘now’ moment frequently depicted as moving along a single horizontal
axis.1 Rancière’s ascent of time has correlations with Rosalind Krauss’s
temporal claims for the palimpsest, which as a structure can be seen also
to vertically order time.2 For Krauss, the palimpsest is “the emblematic
form of the temporal and as such it is the abstraction of narrative, [and]
of history.” While a palimpsest suggests a visual ordering, one stratum
accumulatively placed upon another, its cumulative conclusion can be
less determined, even abstract. Each layer may not fully obscure all that is
beneath. Its vertical structuring creates an ambiguity in understanding its
succession, or understanding how it is that an abstracted outcome arose
from its construction. It asks the question what belongs where? Each layer
may not visually belong solely to its own position, but can be seen to operate
in multiple roles. In temporal terms each layer can be present in more than
one time. This resembles Rancière’s suggestion that anachronism obscures
the conditions of historicity by acknowledging the “multiplicity of lines of
temporality present in ‘one’ time.” The palimpsest can be read, therefore,
as two temporal models discussed in Rancière’s essay, the first, the causal
model of before and after, being the accumulative action of layering, and the
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second, a containment of time framed (or coagulated) as an epoch, being
when the palimpsest is viewed in its entirety.
Rancière suggests the sole method of history does not exist within
a scientific claim but one that needs to resolve “philosophical questions
by means of literary procedures.” Therefore, affinities can be considered
between the work of the historian and that of the artist. John Lewis Gaddis
reiterates this view.
Historians are able to manipulate time and space... they can compress
these dimensions, expand them, compare them, measure them, even
transcend them... the literal representation of reality is not their task.3
While the models of verification remain distinct in each activity—
“Artists don’t normally expect to have their sources checked. Historians do.”4
—Rancière in this text reiterates the need for our understanding of time to
be plural, perhaps even “palimpsestic.”
Connell Vaughan Evental thinking is at the heart of Jacques Rancière’s
philosophy. In a number of his works, Rancière offers us events in the
shape of historical subjects: Gillard in The Nights of Labour, Jacotot in The
Ignorant Schoolmaster, and Blanqui in Disagreement. From the historical
activity of these subjects we learn that an event is something that claims a
radical equality whereby those who normally are excluded by the political
count, by its practices and systems of representation, are made to count.
Such events are more than mere occurrences in the sequence of time
(chronos). The event, for Rancière, is the revelation and assertion of this
historical subject on the basis of equality. Aesthetics, philosophy, education,
politics and, in ‘The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth,’
history, are seen by Rancière to condition and reinforce inequality. He
charges history with performing the same ordering of inequality endemic to
these other disciplines. In particular, the historian’s task has been to give the
“appropriate” orders to different epochs. As regimes of order, however, these
epochs are also regimes of power. The historian is, therefore, like the curator,
the editor, the interior decorator, and the philosopher (for the latter, see
The Philosopher and His Poor). The literary techne of history is a procedure
of evaluation and re-evaluation, creation and re-creation of epochs bound
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by the constraints of chronos. Any confusion, any misplacing of epochs
commits the sin of anachronism.
When bound by chronos, anachrony is illogical, indecent and fatal, be
it a flashback (analepsis) or a flash-forward (prolepsis). One way to think
of this is in terms of the status of time travel as a devalued currency, be it
in cash or immunity. Whichever direction you go, your purchasing power,
your level of immunity, is out of sync.
In the historian’s pursuit of truth the prohibition of “anachronism” is
that temporal procedure that simultaneously makes the practice cohere as
history and, for Rancière, limits the possibility of a philosophy (episteme)
or science of history. “It [anachronism] is the symbol-concept (le conceptemblème) by which history affirms its specificity and its scientificity”. Yet,
“The concept of ‘anachronism’ is anti-historical because it obscures the very
conditions of all historicity”.
A key condition obscured by anachronism is the possibility of the
subject “breaching” her time, the epoch to which history has assigned her.
This is, precisely, the evental activity mentioned above and it operates in a
time that is explicitly not chronological. Rancière does not name this time,
but it requires a view of history that is anachronic.
How would history become a science (or more science-like) and not
simply a literary pretence? Rancière, not bound by the proscription of
anachronism, points toward events that are more than mere occurrences
in the sequence of time (chronos). True history, for Rancière, requires the
assertion of a place in the count of the regime of power by those that have
been allocated no part. It is a history unbound by the restrictions of history’s
sequence of epochs. The structure of reflection on history must, necessarily,
attend to evental change.
Rancière explains history as it is practiced by the likes of Febvre as
a literary inquiry conducted through the appropriate rhetorical modes
(invention, dispositio, and elecutio) of enunciation. The additional two
canons of rhetoric (memoria and pronuntiatio), unmentioned by Rancière,
reveal a key feature of his evental approach. Within the canon of delivery
(pronuntiatio) there is “the crucial moment” (kiaros). Equally, this crucial
moment draws upon the canon of memory (memoria). Kiaros, as opposed
50 Tim Stott Introduction to Jacques Rancière’s The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth

51 Jacques Rancière The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth

to chronos, is visible in the evental declarations of Gillard, Jacotot and
Blanqui, and, I believe, is a useful way to articulate this evental breaching of
chronos by the subject.
In summary, and despite the absence of an account of kiaros, evental
thinking pushes Rancière from history to historicity. With respect to the
latter, other accounts of historical time are available, such as the eternity
of the Christian Æon. For Rancière, eternity is, however, a failed attempt
to redeem time, because it maintains the prohibition on anachronism.
To the Epochists, who would have all time ordered, Rancière proposes a
historicity beyond the epoch. This would be a historicity filled with evental
declarations. This historicity, Rancière seems not to recognise, need not
only await us in the future. It is already ancient. Perhaps it is as old as
historical inquiry itself. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406)
was explicitly concerned with this notion of historicity. Like Febvre, Ibn
Khaldun warned against anachronism. Here, too, history is understood
in terms of social organization. Ibn Khaldun’s theory of “group feeling”
(asabiyyah or asabīya), whereby history is understood in terms of social
cohesion is analogous to the historical epoch. Over chronological time this
will be lost inevitably and, potentially, dialectically by royal authority (mulk).
Nonetheless, for Ibn Khaldun, like Rancière, history is more than a series
of events. Admittedly, like Christian thinkers such as Saint Augustine, Ibn
Khaldun sees a divine purpose to history. Yet this eternity is not subject to
an equalling act of redemption, as witnessed in the case of the Christian
Æon. Instead “perception by the soul does not take place in time and
requires no consecutive order, but takes place all at once and within a single
time element” (Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 106). This time element is
“atomic” (zaman fard). Without depending upon a notion of divine time,
Ibn Khaldun’s insistence on the indivisible moments of atomic time can
accommodate what Rancière describes as a “multiplicity of temporal lines”.
In conclusion, historiography may not be the dominant way of viewing
the past but Geschichteswissenschaft, the historical science that Rancière
seeks, is far from a novel pursuit in the tradition of philosophy. Rancière’s
positive contribution to this episteme is undoubtedly his evental approach.
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